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Go read the case. It doesn't seem to apply to this situation, and the court's decision is not one we would welcome if it did. This is about a land patent fraudulently obtained using a document postdated by the Mexican government. The crux of the issue at hand is repeated litigation and in some cases including this one fraud is not considered enough to retry the case. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/98/61
The case before us comes within this principle. The genuineness and validity of the concession from Micheltorena produced by complainant was the single question pending before the board of commissioners and the District Court for four years. It was the thing, and the only thing, that was controverted, and it was essential to the decree. To overrule the demurrer to this bill would be to retry, twenty years after the decision of these tribunals, the very matter which they tried, on the ground of fraud in the document on which the decree was made. If we can do this now, some other court may be called on twenty years hence to retry the same matter on another allegation of fraudulent combination in this suit to defeat the ends of justice; and so the number of suits would be without limit and the litigation endless about the single question of the validity of this document.
For these reasons, we are of opinion that the decree of the Circuit Court sustaining a demurrer to the bill, and dismissing it on the merits, was right.
except in this case there are hoards of scumbags that did it for biden, with no regard or knowledge of the law, let alone foreign entities being involved which adds yet another element of fraud.
Seems to me that Sydney Powell, Lin Wood, Rudy, and others have been compiling reams of Evidence since the election and still are two weeks later. A few states have already missed their deadlines to decree their winner .......only thing left is to LEGALLY introduce that evidence in the proper venue. Once they get there, seems like a slam dunk. Plenty of time yet!
Fraud doesn't vitiate compromising photos of the decision making leaders & judges though. That's the problem. Fraud doesn't vitiate cashola payments to numbered swiss bank accounts whose numbers are only known to the senders and receivers - with the senders dangling those numbers forevermore over the heads of the receivers. That's the problem.
So we can only hope that everyone involved in the decision making parts of the process from here on out are not A) PAID OFF or B) COMPROMISED.
Proving fraud on behalf of hiden biden anywhere, and he will be nullified ! Last I checked, we have Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and perhaps others, ALL of which provide a chance to prove FRAUD on behalf of biden !
Pretty funny that Biden had a Dominion guy on their larping "transition team" and POTUS retweeted the info... And then Twitter nuked the guy POTUS retweeted entirely AND POTUS's tweet!
The law works based on legal precedent. To win a case, you cite rulings in other prior cases before the same court. The Supreme Court is notorious for not overruling its own prior judgments. So, this is a net positive. It's not a slam dunk, but it's a great precedent to cite when pressing your case before the Supreme Court.
Ok, well, like everyone else prior to this falling into obscurity....cite the case instead of 4chan and maybe someone outside this site will take you seriously. (Nobody can find the link to the case....)
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Walter Van Dyke for the appellant.
Mr. Delos Lake, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
1
In this case a bill in chancery is brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, to use the language of the bill itself, 'by Walter Van Dyke, United States attorney for that district, on behalf of the United States,' against Throckmorton, Howard, Goold, and Haggin.
2
The object of the bill is to have a decree of the court, setting aside and declaring to be null and void a confirmation of the claim of W. A. Richardson under a Mexican grant, to certain lands, made by the board of commissioners of private land-claims in California on the twenty-seventh day of December, 1853; and the decree of the District Court of the United States, made Feb. 11, 1856, affirming the decree of the commissioners, and again confirming Richardson's claim. The general ground on which this relief is asked is that both these decrees were obtained by fraud.
3
The specific act of fraud which is mainly relief on to support the bill is, that after Richardson had filed his petition before the board of commissioners, with a statement of his claim and the documentary evidence of its validity, March 16, 1852, he became satisfied that he had no sufficient evidence of an actual grant or concession to sustain his claim, and with a view to supply this defect, he made a visit to Mexico, and obtained from Micheltorena, former political chief of California, his signature, on or about the first day of July, 1852, to a grant which was falsely and fraudulently antedated, so as to impose on the court the belief that it was made at a time when Micheltorena had power to make such grants in California; and it is alleged that in support of this simulated and false document he also procured and filed therewith the depositions of perjured witnesses.
4
There is much verbiage, repetition, and argumentative matter in the bill; but no allegation whatever that any of the attorneys, agents, or other officers of the government were false in their duty to it, or that they assisted or connived at the fraud, unless a single allegation on that subject, which will be hereafter considered, sufficiently makes such charge. For the present, it will be assumed that no such charge is made.
5
While the bill is elaborate in its statement of matters which are supposed to impeach the decree, and is correspondingly silent as to any thing tending to its support, there are important facts which, it cannot escape attention, could not be omitted. Among these is, that, in attempting to negative the idea that juridical possession of the land was ever delivered to Richardson by the Mexican authorities, it is incidentally admitted that at the time the transaction occurred on which his claim is founded, he was in actual possession and residing on part, if not all, of the land in controversy. So, also, it is tacitly admitted that the archives of the Mexican government, turned over to the office of the United States surveyor-general, and original documents produced by Richardson, showed an espediente which was sufficient to establish the claim, except for the want of the final concession. It is, therefore, to be taken as true that Richardson, being on the land prior to 1838, made his petition to the governor for a grant of this land, which was appropriately referred for information, and that the proper report was had that there was no objection to the grant. According to Mexican law, but two things remained to perfect the title; namely, a grant or concession by the governor, and the delivery of juridical possession. The latter has never been held by this court as indispensable to a confirmation of the grant, and least of all when the party was already in possession, which he had held for many years. It is also important to observe that the original petition was filed before the board, March 16, 1852, and its decree was rendered Dec. 27, 1853; that an appeal was taken to the District Court, where the case remained until Feb. 11, 1856, when it was affirmed; that an appeal was again taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was dismissed by order of the Attorney-General on the second day of April, 1857. The case was pending in litigation, therefore, more than five years before the decree became final, and more than four years after the alleged fraudulent grant by Micheltorena was filed in the case. It is also to be observed that the necessity of such a paper to the support of Richardson's claim had been made obvious to the board of commissioners, to the claimant himself, and to the attorneys representing the government, by the report of the surveyor-general, that while every thing else seemed right in his office, the important final decree of concession was not there. The attention, therefore, of all the parties and of the court must have been drawn to a close scrutiny of any proceeding to supply this important document.
6
There was also ample time to make all necessary inquiries and produce the necessary proof, if it existed, of the fraud. The allegation of the bill is that this simulated concession was filed with the board of commissioners in January, 1853, and the decree rendered on December 27, thereafter. The appeal was pending after this in the District Court over two years; and after the final decree in that court it remained under the consideration of the Attorney-General another year, when he authorized the dismissal of the appeal. The case, then, unless these officers neglected their duties, underwent the scrutiny of two judicial tribunals and of the Attorney-General of the United States, as well as of his subordinate in the State of California, and was before them for a period of five years of litigation.
7
The bill in this case is filed May 13, 1876, more than twenty years after the rendition of the decree which it seeks to annul. During that time Richardson, the claimant, and the man who is personally charged with the guilt of the fraud, has died; his heirs, who with himself were claimants in the suit, are not made parties, and the land has passed from his ownership to that of the present defendants by purchase and conveyance.
8
It is true that the defendants are charged in general terms with being purchasers with notice.
9
It is true that the United States is not bound by the Statute of Limitations, as an individual would be. And we have not recited any of the foregoing matters found in the bill as sufficient of itself to prevent relief in a case otherwise properly cognizable in equity. But we think these are good reasons why a bill which seeks under these circumstances to annul a decree thus surrounded by every presumption which should give it support, shall present on its face a clear and unquestionable ground on which the jurisdiction it invokes can rest.
10
Let us inquire if this has been done.
11
There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. There is also no question that many rights originally founded in fraud become—by lapse of time, by the difficulty of proving the fraud, and by the protection which the law throws around rights once established by formal judicial proceedings in tribunals established by law, according to the methods of the law—no longer open to inquiry in the usual and ordinary methods. Of this class are judgments and decrees of a court deciding between parties before the court and subject to its jurisdiction, in a trial which has presented the claims of the parties, and where they have received the consideration of the court.
12
There are no maxims of the law more firmly established, or of more value in the administration of justice, than the two which are designed to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; namely, interest rei publicae, ut sit finis litium, and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadam causa.
13
If the court has been mistaken in the law, there is a remedy by writ of error. If the jury has been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by motion for new trial. If there has been evidence discovered since the trial, a motion for a new trial will give appropriate relief. But all these are parts of the same proceeding, relief, is given in the same suit, and the party is not vexed by another suit for the same matter. So in a suit in chancery, on proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the injury complained of is an erroneous decision, an appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to correct the error. If new evidence is discovered after the decree has become final, a bill of review on that ground may be filed within the rules prescribed by law on that subject. Here, again, these proceedings are all part of the same suit, and the rule framed for the repose of society is not violated.
14
But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practised on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,—these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing. See Wells, Res Adjudicata, sect. 499; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Wierich v. De Zoya, 7 Ill. 385; Kent v. Ricards, 3 Md. Ch. 392; Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 320; De Louis et al. v. Meek et al., 2 Iowa, 55.
15
In all these cases, and many others which have been examined, relief has been granted, on the ground that, by some fraud practised directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court.
16
On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed. Mr. Wells, in his very useful work on Res Adjudicata, says, sect. 499: 'Fraud vitiates every thing, and a judgment equally with a contract; that is, a judgment obtained directly by fraud, and not merely a judgment founded on a fraudulent instrument; for, in general, the court will not go again into the merits of an action for the purpose of detecting and annulling the fraud.' . . . 'Likewise, there are few exceptions to the rule that equity will not go behind the judgment to interpose in the cause itself, but only when there was some hindrance besides the negligence of the defendant, in presenting the defence in the legal action. There is an old case in South Carolina to the effect that fraud in obtaining a bill of sale would justify equitable interference as to the judgment obtained thereon. But I judge it stands almost or quite alone, and has no weight as a precedent.' The case he refers to is Crauford v. Crauford, 4 Desau. (S. C.) 176. See also Bigelow on Fraud, 170-172.
I'm sure this case will be cited by Trump's legal team in front of SCOTUS. However, if it is applied in the current case, the question would be to what extent would the outcome be vitiated. I do not believe they would apply it to the entirety of the US presidential election. Would they apply it just to the outcome in certain States? Would they apply it only to the outcome in certain (fraudulent) counties in those states (like Wayne County, MI)?
It would seem that the best option, i.e. the one that would cause the least disruption, would be to apply this specifically to the districts with the clearest cases of fraud. Then each state (like GA, PA, MI, WI, NV, AZ, etc.) could proceed with their count, but just exclude the counties with clear fraud.
If states were thrown out completely, that would then change the required count in the electoral college. Currently, there are 538 electoral votes, so to win a candidate needs 1 more than half or 270. If let's say PA were thrown out completely (which I think is unlikely), its 20 electoral votes would also be removed from the total making it just 518 total electoral votes, so 260 would be needed to win.
Again, this latter case seems unlikely. Throwing out the entire election seems entirely unlikely and even if it were done, that would just throw it to the House.
If Throckmorton were applied, I think it would only be used to invalidate counties within states from the total count.
"vi·ti·ate
/ˈviSHēˌāt/
Learn to pronounce
verbFORMAL
spoil or impair the quality or efficiency of.
"development programs have been vitiated by the rise in population"
destroy or impair the legal validity of.
"the insurance is vitiated because of foolish acts on the part of the tenant""
yet another ace in the hole.
It may not vitiate the whole election, but maybe state by state or county by county.
THIS... And exactly why Trump put 3 Constitutional Judges on the Supreme Court. He saw this coming a mile away!
You guys might want to read this: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/98/61/
This is about Mexican land grants.
I looked it up too.. no guarantee they would apply that to elections (I'm happy to be proven wrong on this).
One step at a time. Still reading this: https://www.dictionary.com/browse/vitiate?s=t
Go read the case. It doesn't seem to apply to this situation, and the court's decision is not one we would welcome if it did. This is about a land patent fraudulently obtained using a document postdated by the Mexican government. The crux of the issue at hand is repeated litigation and in some cases including this one fraud is not considered enough to retry the case. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/98/61
And interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. Bad end.
But what if a scum bag cheats for the side he wants to lose gets caught on purpose and reverse psychologied a win for his team.
except in this case there are hoards of scumbags that did it for biden, with no regard or knowledge of the law, let alone foreign entities being involved which adds yet another element of fraud.
Proving that in such little time is the contest.
Seems to me that Sydney Powell, Lin Wood, Rudy, and others have been compiling reams of Evidence since the election and still are two weeks later. A few states have already missed their deadlines to decree their winner .......only thing left is to LEGALLY introduce that evidence in the proper venue. Once they get there, seems like a slam dunk. Plenty of time yet!
True btw I like your name bro !
Fraud doesn't vitiate compromising photos of the decision making leaders & judges though. That's the problem. Fraud doesn't vitiate cashola payments to numbered swiss bank accounts whose numbers are only known to the senders and receivers - with the senders dangling those numbers forevermore over the heads of the receivers. That's the problem.
So we can only hope that everyone involved in the decision making parts of the process from here on out are not A) PAID OFF or B) COMPROMISED.
I showed this to my attorney friend and he laughed. “A land grant? You’re putting your hopes on a land grant case??”
That precedent is so racist! REEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
yeps. pay no attention to the lower courts. Its just political theater.
I just made a hundred dollar bet that biden won't be president
Proving fraud on behalf of hiden biden anywhere, and he will be nullified ! Last I checked, we have Nevada, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and perhaps others, ALL of which provide a chance to prove FRAUD on behalf of biden !
Error in title: Case stems from 1878 .....
Pretty funny that Biden had a Dominion guy on their larping "transition team" and POTUS retweeted the info... And then Twitter nuked the guy POTUS retweeted entirely AND POTUS's tweet!
Kind of a "falsus en uno, falsus en omnibus" thing
Just have to prove that they stole one state
sounds like common sense
1878
The law works based on legal precedent. To win a case, you cite rulings in other prior cases before the same court. The Supreme Court is notorious for not overruling its own prior judgments. So, this is a net positive. It's not a slam dunk, but it's a great precedent to cite when pressing your case before the Supreme Court.
Corrected via comment
This shit is days old, it's nothing of merit.
The case is years old and still has merit. That's how the legal system works, by precedent.
Ok, well, like everyone else prior to this falling into obscurity....cite the case instead of 4chan and maybe someone outside this site will take you seriously. (Nobody can find the link to the case....)
Ok. Done: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/98/61
98 U.S. 61
25 L.Ed. 93
UNITED STATES v. THROCKMORTON.
October Term, 1878
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. Walter Van Dyke for the appellant.
Mr. Delos Lake, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
1 In this case a bill in chancery is brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, to use the language of the bill itself, 'by Walter Van Dyke, United States attorney for that district, on behalf of the United States,' against Throckmorton, Howard, Goold, and Haggin.
2 The object of the bill is to have a decree of the court, setting aside and declaring to be null and void a confirmation of the claim of W. A. Richardson under a Mexican grant, to certain lands, made by the board of commissioners of private land-claims in California on the twenty-seventh day of December, 1853; and the decree of the District Court of the United States, made Feb. 11, 1856, affirming the decree of the commissioners, and again confirming Richardson's claim. The general ground on which this relief is asked is that both these decrees were obtained by fraud.
3 The specific act of fraud which is mainly relief on to support the bill is, that after Richardson had filed his petition before the board of commissioners, with a statement of his claim and the documentary evidence of its validity, March 16, 1852, he became satisfied that he had no sufficient evidence of an actual grant or concession to sustain his claim, and with a view to supply this defect, he made a visit to Mexico, and obtained from Micheltorena, former political chief of California, his signature, on or about the first day of July, 1852, to a grant which was falsely and fraudulently antedated, so as to impose on the court the belief that it was made at a time when Micheltorena had power to make such grants in California; and it is alleged that in support of this simulated and false document he also procured and filed therewith the depositions of perjured witnesses.
4 There is much verbiage, repetition, and argumentative matter in the bill; but no allegation whatever that any of the attorneys, agents, or other officers of the government were false in their duty to it, or that they assisted or connived at the fraud, unless a single allegation on that subject, which will be hereafter considered, sufficiently makes such charge. For the present, it will be assumed that no such charge is made.
5 While the bill is elaborate in its statement of matters which are supposed to impeach the decree, and is correspondingly silent as to any thing tending to its support, there are important facts which, it cannot escape attention, could not be omitted. Among these is, that, in attempting to negative the idea that juridical possession of the land was ever delivered to Richardson by the Mexican authorities, it is incidentally admitted that at the time the transaction occurred on which his claim is founded, he was in actual possession and residing on part, if not all, of the land in controversy. So, also, it is tacitly admitted that the archives of the Mexican government, turned over to the office of the United States surveyor-general, and original documents produced by Richardson, showed an espediente which was sufficient to establish the claim, except for the want of the final concession. It is, therefore, to be taken as true that Richardson, being on the land prior to 1838, made his petition to the governor for a grant of this land, which was appropriately referred for information, and that the proper report was had that there was no objection to the grant. According to Mexican law, but two things remained to perfect the title; namely, a grant or concession by the governor, and the delivery of juridical possession. The latter has never been held by this court as indispensable to a confirmation of the grant, and least of all when the party was already in possession, which he had held for many years. It is also important to observe that the original petition was filed before the board, March 16, 1852, and its decree was rendered Dec. 27, 1853; that an appeal was taken to the District Court, where the case remained until Feb. 11, 1856, when it was affirmed; that an appeal was again taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was dismissed by order of the Attorney-General on the second day of April, 1857. The case was pending in litigation, therefore, more than five years before the decree became final, and more than four years after the alleged fraudulent grant by Micheltorena was filed in the case. It is also to be observed that the necessity of such a paper to the support of Richardson's claim had been made obvious to the board of commissioners, to the claimant himself, and to the attorneys representing the government, by the report of the surveyor-general, that while every thing else seemed right in his office, the important final decree of concession was not there. The attention, therefore, of all the parties and of the court must have been drawn to a close scrutiny of any proceeding to supply this important document.
6 There was also ample time to make all necessary inquiries and produce the necessary proof, if it existed, of the fraud. The allegation of the bill is that this simulated concession was filed with the board of commissioners in January, 1853, and the decree rendered on December 27, thereafter. The appeal was pending after this in the District Court over two years; and after the final decree in that court it remained under the consideration of the Attorney-General another year, when he authorized the dismissal of the appeal. The case, then, unless these officers neglected their duties, underwent the scrutiny of two judicial tribunals and of the Attorney-General of the United States, as well as of his subordinate in the State of California, and was before them for a period of five years of litigation.
7 The bill in this case is filed May 13, 1876, more than twenty years after the rendition of the decree which it seeks to annul. During that time Richardson, the claimant, and the man who is personally charged with the guilt of the fraud, has died; his heirs, who with himself were claimants in the suit, are not made parties, and the land has passed from his ownership to that of the present defendants by purchase and conveyance.
8 It is true that the defendants are charged in general terms with being purchasers with notice.
9 It is true that the United States is not bound by the Statute of Limitations, as an individual would be. And we have not recited any of the foregoing matters found in the bill as sufficient of itself to prevent relief in a case otherwise properly cognizable in equity. But we think these are good reasons why a bill which seeks under these circumstances to annul a decree thus surrounded by every presumption which should give it support, shall present on its face a clear and unquestionable ground on which the jurisdiction it invokes can rest.
10 Let us inquire if this has been done.
11 There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. There is also no question that many rights originally founded in fraud become—by lapse of time, by the difficulty of proving the fraud, and by the protection which the law throws around rights once established by formal judicial proceedings in tribunals established by law, according to the methods of the law—no longer open to inquiry in the usual and ordinary methods. Of this class are judgments and decrees of a court deciding between parties before the court and subject to its jurisdiction, in a trial which has presented the claims of the parties, and where they have received the consideration of the court.
12 There are no maxims of the law more firmly established, or of more value in the administration of justice, than the two which are designed to prevent repeated litigation between the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; namely, interest rei publicae, ut sit finis litium, and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadam causa.
13 If the court has been mistaken in the law, there is a remedy by writ of error. If the jury has been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by motion for new trial. If there has been evidence discovered since the trial, a motion for a new trial will give appropriate relief. But all these are parts of the same proceeding, relief, is given in the same suit, and the party is not vexed by another suit for the same matter. So in a suit in chancery, on proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the injury complained of is an erroneous decision, an appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to correct the error. If new evidence is discovered after the decree has become final, a bill of review on that ground may be filed within the rules prescribed by law on that subject. Here, again, these proceedings are all part of the same suit, and the rule framed for the repose of society is not violated.
14 But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practised on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,—these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing. See Wells, Res Adjudicata, sect. 499; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Wierich v. De Zoya, 7 Ill. 385; Kent v. Ricards, 3 Md. Ch. 392; Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 320; De Louis et al. v. Meek et al., 2 Iowa, 55.
15 In all these cases, and many others which have been examined, relief has been granted, on the ground that, by some fraud practised directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court.
16 On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed. Mr. Wells, in his very useful work on Res Adjudicata, says, sect. 499: 'Fraud vitiates every thing, and a judgment equally with a contract; that is, a judgment obtained directly by fraud, and not merely a judgment founded on a fraudulent instrument; for, in general, the court will not go again into the merits of an action for the purpose of detecting and annulling the fraud.' . . . 'Likewise, there are few exceptions to the rule that equity will not go behind the judgment to interpose in the cause itself, but only when there was some hindrance besides the negligence of the defendant, in presenting the defence in the legal action. There is an old case in South Carolina to the effect that fraud in obtaining a bill of sale would justify equitable interference as to the judgment obtained thereon. But I judge it stands almost or quite alone, and has no weight as a precedent.' The case he refers to is Crauford v. Crauford, 4 Desau. (S. C.) 176. See also Bigelow on Fraud, 170-172.
17 The principle and the distinctio
MY DUDE! You've done what the rest of the internet apparently couldn't! You got the link?
BIG KAHUNA, INDEED!
Link is at the top. law.Cornell.edu etc
Thanks!
I'm sure this case will be cited by Trump's legal team in front of SCOTUS. However, if it is applied in the current case, the question would be to what extent would the outcome be vitiated. I do not believe they would apply it to the entirety of the US presidential election. Would they apply it just to the outcome in certain States? Would they apply it only to the outcome in certain (fraudulent) counties in those states (like Wayne County, MI)?
It would seem that the best option, i.e. the one that would cause the least disruption, would be to apply this specifically to the districts with the clearest cases of fraud. Then each state (like GA, PA, MI, WI, NV, AZ, etc.) could proceed with their count, but just exclude the counties with clear fraud.
If states were thrown out completely, that would then change the required count in the electoral college. Currently, there are 538 electoral votes, so to win a candidate needs 1 more than half or 270. If let's say PA were thrown out completely (which I think is unlikely), its 20 electoral votes would also be removed from the total making it just 518 total electoral votes, so 260 would be needed to win.
Again, this latter case seems unlikely. Throwing out the entire election seems entirely unlikely and even if it were done, that would just throw it to the House.
If Throckmorton were applied, I think it would only be used to invalidate counties within states from the total count.
"vi·ti·ate /ˈviSHēˌāt/ Learn to pronounce verbFORMAL spoil or impair the quality or efficiency of. "development programs have been vitiated by the rise in population" destroy or impair the legal validity of. "the insurance is vitiated because of foolish acts on the part of the tenant""