I knew the moment that I compared voter turnout in CO and found that primary voter turnout from 2016 to 2020 increased by over 140% despite population increasing less than 5% that something was off. Now, I'm digging into all the connections, but it's a lot.
The more I dig, the more shit bothers me.
E.g.
- Colorado uses ARLO software from VotingWorks to conduct Risk-Limiting Audits (a statistical sample-based audit approach that is theoretically efficient and accurate, but as Yogi Berra said, "In theory there's no difference between theory and practice, but in practice there is...")
- VotingWorks is a non-profit; I immediately don't fucking trust them, but they also were incubated by CDT(https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/center-for-democracy-and-technology/) and funded by Google, FB, Apple, MS, and Soros' Open Society Foundation (https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/voting-works/)
- In fact, VotingWorks "product manager for Risk-limiting Audits" is Monica Childers (https://www.linkedin.com/in/monicacranechilders/), who was the "Product Consultant - Colorado Risk-limiting Audit Software" while she worked for Democracy Works, which is ALSO funded by Soros' Open Society Foundations, the Democracy Fund, Omidyar's network, etc. (https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/democracy-works/)
- VotingWorks Partners with Security Compass to secure Risk-Limiting Audit Software Arlo (https://voting.works/news/2020/11/votingworks-partners-with-security-compass-to-secure-risk-limiting-audit-software-arlo/)
- A bunch of the Security Compass staff are Iranian graduates of the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran (https://www.linkedin.com/in/nima-dezhkam-88b499a/)(https://www.linkedin.com/in/ehsanforoughi/) with LI endorsements from other Sharif grads(https://www.linkedin.com/in/ali-s-27a991b/)
- VotingWorks also helped push vote-by-mail
- CO is a member of the (again...) non-profit Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), the board members of which is a who's who of this fucking cabal, e.g. CO's Director, Division of Elections, Colorado SecState, Judd Choate (https://www.linkedin.com/in/judd-choate-068877a/), who's endorsed by Brian Hancock (https://www.linkedin.com/in/brian-hancock-29899148/) "Director, Infrastructure Policy and Product Development at Unisyn Voting Solutions," formerly member of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), and one of the shills that signed off on the statement that this was "the most secure election in U.S. history"
- ERIC requires that member states provide "records from the state licensing/identification agency (typically, this is the state motor vehicle agency) for all residents with active records---not just registered voters" every 60 days; I think this is where they are getting the fodder for high-tech ballot stuffing/vote padding since this provides them lists of names/addresses, without restricting them to registered voters - if they have enough states, they also know who moved, but that doesn't keep them from using those names in the states the individuals left (https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ERIC-Membership-Summary-v20190603.pdf)
- BallotTrax (https://ballottrax.com/), a subsidiary of i3logix(https://i3logix.com/), also in Colorado (and also, curiously, listed as a "printing" company(), tracks the ballots that are printed, mailed, and received (and where they're received, based on USPS data - which would also, BTW, include optical scans of the exterior of mailed ballots, which means it includes optical scans of the fucking signatures) and when you combine that with, e.g. Runbeck (https://runbeck.net/) which also has an office (industrial space) in Colorado, and which uses the states' database and provides all the printed ballot/envelope data/images back to the states/their designated contractors, and which provides a "print on demand" system, Sentio (https://runbeck.net/election-solutions/ballot-printing-on-demand/sentio-on-demand-ballot-printing-system/), we're seeing the unassembled pieces of a puzzle
- I'm just getting started digging into Pro V&V, in Huntsville, that supposedly certifies the voting systems (and SLI Compliance, in Colorado, that does the same, with only two of 13 employees on LI even showing that they studied computer science) - again, endorsed by fucking Hancock, and owned by Gaming Labs International (GLI, LLC), which has its Colorado headquarters at the same street address as SLI)
All of these companies' employees, BTW, donate almost exclusively to ActBlue, Biden, Warren, etc, though some hide it (e.g. Monica Childers donated and the FEC log says she said she was unemployed, but her LI profile said she was employed by Democracy Works in that same timeframe).
Anyway, could use some help.
With a bunch of leftists running everything, it looks like they could easily have a sophisticated vote fraud operation that there would be no reason to suspect because they've mastered it.
But I don't think you could find proof unless you had access to their systems, and even then, they probably cover their tracks. Only an audit that compares electronic records of votes to physical ballots would turn something up, and there's no grounds for that.
So what kind of help do you need?
This! Open source software means the original code is published and can be audited by anyone. This should be public domain code, published online, not obfuscated in any way, and there should be some system in place to correct it should anyone discover a flaw. This is usually the nature of open source software.
The counter argument, (that I do not really agree with) is that publishing the code could make it less secure should someone find a flaw and hide it for themselves. Really, if it is public then both the good guys and the bad guys will have the same access, and we can probably trust that there are enough clever good guys who will share any flaws. Keeping it closed source only allows secrets to prevail.
Theoretically it's a sound practice, but in the real world, there are just too many things to account for when you are dealing with the real world. Somthing as simple as social engineering can make somthing that seemed bulletproof in code swing wide open in practice. Even if you could make an "unhackable" software, there will always be some odd angle for an exploit.