In order to do this properly, each machine must have it's own public/private key pair. Then, when the XML/JSON is exported, the machine signs the exported file with its private key.
When importing the file elsewhere, the receiving machine would need all the public keys. When importing it, it would use the machine identifier (in the file, and therefore protected by the signature) to select the correct public key, then use that to confirm the file came from the specified machine, and that it had not been modified.
In order to protect the integrity of the process, a key management process must be created to segregate the private keys from the public keys, so that no one can circumvent the digital chain of custody.
It's not rocket science. This is all well-established technology. Open source software already exists to do it.
meanwhile customers are asking for options such as ballot weights for elections.
NO ONE should ever have that feature. If you want to skew votes so that there is a 1.3 weight for one candidate over the other, you can do that after the votes have been totaled and do it on the final results.
Instead this nonsense is baked in and then we have no idea if its enabled or not.
It should never have existed.
And don't get me started on how logs are proprietary info and the state agreed we shouldn't have access to it.
In order to do that, they have to disable certificate verification by the clients. An SSL cert is tied to the domain name of the server, and the only way you can use the same cert for multiple servers: a load-balancer precedes them.
Given everything else we have seen, I would seriously doubt security in any form was done for systems that literally have over a dozen exploits
Yup, I doubt it, too.
In order to do this properly, each machine must have it's own public/private key pair. Then, when the XML/JSON is exported, the machine signs the exported file with its private key.
When importing the file elsewhere, the receiving machine would need all the public keys. When importing it, it would use the machine identifier (in the file, and therefore protected by the signature) to select the correct public key, then use that to confirm the file came from the specified machine, and that it had not been modified.
In order to protect the integrity of the process, a key management process must be created to segregate the private keys from the public keys, so that no one can circumvent the digital chain of custody.
It's not rocket science. This is all well-established technology. Open source software already exists to do it.
meanwhile customers are asking for options such as ballot weights for elections.
NO ONE should ever have that feature. If you want to skew votes so that there is a 1.3 weight for one candidate over the other, you can do that after the votes have been totaled and do it on the final results.
Instead this nonsense is baked in and then we have no idea if its enabled or not.
It should never have existed.
And don't get me started on how logs are proprietary info and the state agreed we shouldn't have access to it.
Here is a little factoid. Most of the Dominion servers share the same SSL cert.
In order to do that, they have to disable certificate verification by the clients. An SSL cert is tied to the domain name of the server, and the only way you can use the same cert for multiple servers: a load-balancer precedes them.
Yes.