He said Ohio does not support the relief that Texas seeks but that the Court should rule that courts and executive officers cannot change election laws.
Article II of the Constitution directs that “[e]ach State shall appoint” presidential electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” Art. II, §1, cl.2. Whatever “the Legislature thereof” means, it does not mean “the courts thereof.” Thus, when state election codes dictate the manner for appointing presidential electors, state courts must respect the legislature’s work: they may not change the rules by which electors are chosen through judge-made doc- trines or by rewriting statutes in the guise of interpre- tation. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Leg- islature, 592 U.S. __, slip op. 9 n.1 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar, 592 U.S. __, slip op. 1 (2020) (Statement of Alito, J.). This does not mean that state-court interpretations of state law are entitled to no deference. But at some point, a purported “inter- pretation” becomes “not a construction” of the relevant text, “but a rewriting of it.” State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936). The Electors Clause prohibits such rewritings in the context of presidential elections...
Although Ohio does not endorse Texas’s proposed relief, it does endorse its call for a ruling on the mean- ing of the Electors Clause. More precisely, Ohio urges the Court to decide, at the earliest available oppor- tunity, whether state courts and state executive actors violate the Electors Clause when they change the rules by which presidential elections are run. In late October, Justice Alito predicted that the Court’s fail- ure to decide that question in another case had “need- lessly created conditions that could lead to serious post-election problems.” Boockvar, 592 U.S. __, slip op. at 1 (Statement of Alito, J.). Unfortunately, he was right. In many States, citizens voted for President un- der rules created by state judiciaries and state execu- tive actors rather than state legislatures. See, e.g., id., slip op. at 1–2; Moore v. Circosta, 592 U.S. __, slip op. 1–2 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of ap- plication for injunctive relief); Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136, 151–52 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring). Because this Court has never decided whether the Electors Clause permits such alterations to the method for choosing presidential electors, Americans are left to wonder whether the process by which they voted for President ...
In States around the country, judges and exec- utive officials changed the rules that would govern the election “immediately preceding or during” the elec- tion. Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 104 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020). If there is anything more American than representative gov- ernment, it is a firm conviction that the rules ought not be changed after the game has begun. Because this Court has never held that the Electors Clause for- bids state courts and state executive officers from meddling with state legislatures’ work, state courts and state executive officers retained leeway to change the rules in the final stretch of election season.>
He said Ohio does not support the relief that Texas seeks but that the Court should rule that courts and executive officers cannot change election laws.
Although Ohio does not endorse Texas’s proposed relief, it does endorse its call for a ruling on the mean- ing of the Electors Clause. More precisely, Ohio urges the Court to decide, at the earliest available oppor- tunity, whether state courts and state executive actors violate the Electors Clause when they change the rules by which presidential elections are run. In late October, Justice Alito predicted that the Court’s fail- ure to decide that question in another case had “need- lessly created conditions that could lead to serious post-election problems.” Boockvar, 592 U.S. __, slip op. at 1 (Statement of Alito, J.). Unfortunately, he was right. In many States, citizens voted for President un- der rules created by state judiciaries and state execu- tive actors rather than state legislatures. See, e.g., id., slip op. at 1–2; Moore v. Circosta, 592 U.S. __, slip op. 1–2 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of ap- plication for injunctive relief); Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136, 151–52 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring). Because this Court has never decided whether the Electors Clause permits such alterations to the method for choosing presidential electors, Americans are left to wonder whether the process by which they voted for President ...
In States around the country, judges and exec- utive officials changed the rules that would govern the election “immediately preceding or during” the elec- tion. Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 104 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see also Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020). If there is anything more American than representative gov- ernment, it is a firm conviction that the rules ought not be changed after the game has begun. Because this Court has never held that the Electors Clause for- bids state courts and state executive officers from meddling with state legislatures’ work, state courts and state executive officers retained leeway to change the rules in the final stretch of election season.>
What a limp dick
Yep