appear to be enough to establish the admissibility of the FBI 302 because it is obvious that Defendant will continue to aggressively attack Ms. Giuffre’s credibility by claiming that she is improperly seeking money through this lawsuit or through publicity that will help her write a book. Showing that, in 2011, Ms. Giuffre had reported her allegations to the FBI, will obviously respond to such suggestions. But, Defendant presents a strawman characterization of how the evidence will be used, arguing that Ms. Giuffre will attempt to use the FBI 302 only to respond to suggestions that, in meeting with journalist Sharon Churcher, Ms. Giuffre had no improper motive. See Mot. at 4. Defendant then argues that Ms. Giuffre’s 2011 meeting with Ms. Churcher pre-dated by a few weeks the 2011 FBI meeting, and thus the statement is not a prior consistent statement—i.e., was not made prior to meeting with Ms. Churcher. If this case were solely about Ms. Giuffre’s statements to Ms. Churcher, Defendant might have an argument. But obviously the case is not so limited—as the Court can immediately determine by reviewing the voluminous pleadings Defendant has filed in this case attempting to assassinate the character of Ms. Giuffre on any number of grounds. The FBI 302 rebuts many of those attacks. For example, Defendant’s press release itself suggests that, on December 30, 2014, when Ms. Giuffre filed her CVRA Joinder Motion, she was acting improperly. Of course, a meeting with FBI agents more than three years earlier—in 2011—immediately rebuts the suggestion that the December 30, 2014, the CVRA Joinder Motion was some sort of recent fabrication. Rule 801(d)(2)(B)(i) clearly allows the statement to be admitted. See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). It is important to understand that the hearsay rules do not artificially require Ms. Giuffre to point to some specific statement from Defendant attacking her credibility before she is allowed to introduce a prior consistent statement. The rule itself is broadly written, allowing a 4

Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 730 Filed 03/17/17 Page 8 of 14 prior consistent statement to be admitted to rebut an “implied” charge of fabrication. The Second Circuit has made clear that the party admitting a prior consistent statement does “not have to point to a specific inconsistent statement” being attacked. United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987). Instead, it is enough to show that opposing counsel has “attacked [the witness’] credibility on cross-examination.” Id. Indeed, “it matters not, however, whether the inconsistent statement is put in through specific testimony or through mischaracterization or suggestive or misleading cross-examination.” United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming admission of prior consistent statement). If the Court can be certain of one thing in this case, it is that Defendant will raise a broadside attack on Ms. Giuffre’s credibility through cross-examination. Ms. Giuffre will, of course, answer those questions. But she is also entitled to present to the jury evidence supporting her credibility as well by showing this prior consistent statement. To be sure, at this pre-trial stage of the process, the Court cannot be entirely certain of how the trial will unfold. Accordingly, while it seems obvious now that the FBI 302 will be admissible to respond to attacks on Ms. Giuffre’s credibility, the Court may wish to defer ruling on this issue until after Ms. Giuffre is cross-examined. Certainly, at the very least, it would be improper to exclude the evidence at this juncture given that the FBI 302 will undoubtedly become admissible at trial. B. EVENIFTREATEDASHEARSAY,THEFBI302ISADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO RULE 803(8) AS A PUBLIC RECORD. For all the reasons just explained, the FBI 302 is not hearsay. Even if the Court were to regard it as hearsay, however, the 302 would still be admissible. Because the document was prepared by a highly-credible public agency—the Federal Bureau of Investigation on a federally- approved form—it is a report of a public office and qualifies for exemption from the hearsay 5

Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 730 Filed 03/17/17 Page 9 of 14 rules either as a public record under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) or as a regularly kept business record under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). As Defendant is forced to concede in her motion, Mot. at 2, Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) provides an exception to the hearsay prohibition for: (8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if: (A) it sets out: (i) the office’s activities; (ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or (iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. Here, there can be little doubt that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is a “public office.” Nor can there be any real doubt that the FBI’s recording of Ms. Giuffre’s statement is a “matter observed while under a legal duty to report.” The FBI’s “‘duty to report’ encompasses duties explicitly required by law, and also matters within the general subject-matter of the agency which logically assist it in fulfilling its functions, even if no specific statute or regulation mandate that such reports be made.” 5 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 34:13 (7th ed.) (citing U.S. v. Puente, 826 F.2d 1415 (5th Cir. 1987)). Similar FBI records have been regularly admitted by the courts into evidence under this provision, including this court. See, e.g., Spanierman Gallery, Profit Sharing Plan v. Merritt, No. 00CIV5712LTSTHK, 2003 WL 22909160, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2003) (“As is true for police reports, FBI reports are admissible in evidence as either business records, see Fed. R .Evid. 803(6), or as public records, see Fed. R. Evid. 803(8).”); Upstate Shredding, LLC v. Ne. Ferrous, Inc., No. 312CV1015LEKDEP, 2016 WL 865299, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (“The 302 Report itself is admissible as a business record or a public record.”); see also Parsons 6

Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 730 Filed 03/17/17 Page 10 of 14 v. Honeywell, Inc., 929 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir.1991) (police report admissible as public record under Rule 803(8)). For example, in U.S. ex rel. Wuestenhoefer v. Jefferson, the Court admitted FBI 302’s on the basis of Rule 803(8) holding that, “while the subject matters of the witness statements were not observed by the agents, it is clear that the statements themselves were ‘observed.’” No. 4:10-CV-00012-DMB, 2014 WL 7185428, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 16, 2014). The Court specifically recognized that, “[t]here can be no doubt that summaries of interviews conducted during the course of investigating a federal crime fall squarely within the category of ‘matters within the general subject-matter of [the FBI] which logically assist it in fulfilling its functions.’” Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that FBI 302’s meet the "duty to report" requirement of Rule 803(8). Id. Likewise here, while the Special Agents who interviewed Ms. Giuffre did not personally observe Jeffrey Epstein or any of his co-conspirators sexually abuse Ms. Giuffre when she was underage, the agents did observe Ms. Giuffre make the statements delineated within the report. Therefore, the FBI 302 is readily admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(ii). Attempting to defeat admissibility, Defendant makes the far-fetched argument that somehow the FBI Agents who had travelled all the way to Australia to interview Ms. Giuffre (with an Assistant U.S. Attorney listening in on the phone) were not conducting a “legally authorized” investigation. This argument is ludicrous and has no bearing on admissibility under 803(A)(ii). Even though the U.S. Attorney’s Office had previously entered into a Non- Prosecution Agreement with Epstein and his potential co-conspirators, the Office would have been entitled to investigate the involvement of any other persons in sex trafficking and any other locations where sex-trafficking occurred.