Good for us to be awake, now we just need to get a real plan and get on the same page on what to do. FWIW I’m not smart enough to figure it out. But I can do what I’m told.
Maryland, before they had touchscreens, had a very simple system. They had a long paper ballot with big print. A voter would use a wide-tip, black marker to complete an arrow to a name or yes or no.
The voter would place the ballot in a sleeve and run it through a scanner, which would detect mis-marked or multiple voted ballots.
Results were phoned in, and in the off-year election that I observed, the votes were counted within a half hour of the polls closing.
I was at a meeting where one of the engineers who was supposed to design the new touch-screen system told the proponent, Shane Pendergrass, that the touch-screen machines could not be made secure. He said they already had a perfect system (It did survive an audit, with 3 votes questionable). She insisted on spending 90M on the new, vulnerable system.
Good for us to be awake, now we just need to get a real plan and get on the same page on what to do. FWIW I’m not smart enough to figure it out. But I can do what I’m told.
Pressuring districts for the removal of all electronic voting machines. Paper ballots only is a great first step.
Maryland, before they had touchscreens, had a very simple system. They had a long paper ballot with big print. A voter would use a wide-tip, black marker to complete an arrow to a name or yes or no.
The voter would place the ballot in a sleeve and run it through a scanner, which would detect mis-marked or multiple voted ballots.
Results were phoned in, and in the off-year election that I observed, the votes were counted within a half hour of the polls closing.
I was at a meeting where one of the engineers who was supposed to design the new touch-screen system told the proponent, Shane Pendergrass, that the touch-screen machines could not be made secure. He said they already had a perfect system (It did survive an audit, with 3 votes questionable). She insisted on spending 90M on the new, vulnerable system.
We know how to do decent vote tabulation.
We know how to have secure elections. There's a reason we don't. One reason.