Here's the two opposing arguments, and now Congress has to decide who has the winning argument:
Gorsuch:
We agree that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex. But, as we've seen, discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first cannot happen without the second. Nor is there any such thing as a "canon of donut holes," in which Congress's failure to speak directly to a specificcase that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception. Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule. And that is exactly how this Court has alwaysapproached Title VII. "Sexual harassment" is conceptuallydistinct from sex discrimination, but it can fall within Title VII's sweep. Oncale, 523 U. S., at 79–80. Same with "motherhood discrimination." See Phillips, 400 U. S., at 544. Would the employers have us reverse those cases on the theory that Congress could have spoken to those problems more specifically? Of course not. As enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of discrimination because of sex, however they may manifest themselves or whatever other labels might attach to them.
Alito:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on any of five specified grounds: "race, color, religion, sex, [and] national origin." 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). Neither "sexual orientation" nor "gender identity" appears on that list. For the past 45 years, bills have been introduced in Congress to add "sexual orientation" to the list, and in recent years, bills have included"gender identity" as well. But to date, none has passed both Houses. . . .
You need evidence. Evidence is the only way to prove intent. Comey had plenty of evidence to prove criminal intent. He just chose to ignore it.
So do we have evidence that the people who enacted the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not consider "sexual orientation" to be "gender"?
Here's the two opposing arguments, and now Congress has to decide who has the winning argument:
Gorsuch: We agree that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct concepts from sex. But, as we've seen, discrimination based on homosexuality or transgender status necessarily entails discrimination based on sex; the first cannot happen without the second. Nor is there any such thing as a "canon of donut holes," in which Congress's failure to speak directly to a specificcase that falls within a more general statutory rule creates a tacit exception. Instead, when Congress chooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule. And that is exactly how this Court has alwaysapproached Title VII. "Sexual harassment" is conceptuallydistinct from sex discrimination, but it can fall within Title VII's sweep. Oncale, 523 U. S., at 79–80. Same with "motherhood discrimination." See Phillips, 400 U. S., at 544. Would the employers have us reverse those cases on the theory that Congress could have spoken to those problems more specifically? Of course not. As enacted, Title VII prohibits all forms of discrimination because of sex, however they may manifest themselves or whatever other labels might attach to them.
Alito: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on any of five specified grounds: "race, color, religion, sex, [and] national origin." 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). Neither "sexual orientation" nor "gender identity" appears on that list. For the past 45 years, bills have been introduced in Congress to add "sexual orientation" to the list, and in recent years, bills have included"gender identity" as well. But to date, none has passed both Houses. . . .
We should make a word in the english language for if someone has a penis or vagina. Then we we could finally write clear laws.